While convergent knowledge is based on prior knowledge, divergent thinking is based on imagination.

聚敛性知识建先知识的基础上，而发散性思维建象力的基础上。

Put another way, I didn't want to write a book, even a short one like this, that would leave me feeling like either a literary gas-bag or a transcendental asshole.

换句话说，我不写出一本书，哪怕是像这样很薄的一本小书，却落得结果，感觉自己要么是文学臭屁王，或者是先主义的混账。

For example, in situations where people have to make a choice using no prior knowledge, those with a high NFC seem to spend more time researching their options.

例如，人们不得不没有先知识的情况下做出选择时，那些结束感需要程度高的人似乎会花更多的时间去研究他们的选择。

And note that this AI wasn't told anything about the game, not even the rules, and was just instructed to try to find a way to win.

注意，这人工智能系统并没有任何关于这游戏的先知识，甚至没有规，只是被设定为以胜利为目标。

For example, multiple studies have found that a high NFC can cause someone to make rash decisions — especially when they already have prior knowledge about a subject.

例如，多项研究发现，结束感需要程度高会导致一些人做出草率的决定，特别是当他们已经对某主题有了先知识的时候。

The quick decision-making likely comes in when they do have prior knowledge that they can draw from to get a satisfying answer — basically, a short-cut to that sense of closure.

快速决策很可能出现确实具有先知识的情况下，人们可以从中得到满意的答案，基本上来说，这是获得结束感的一种捷径。

Now, this rule of thumb clearly cannot work for  higher priors.

现，这条经法显然不适用于较高的先概率。

So I do something called transcendental meditation every morning with my husband.

所以我每天早上都和丈夫一起做一种叫做先冥的事情。

Now, shadow AI isn't always bad a priori.

现，影子AI并非先地总是不好的。

People come at the question with a priori commitments about what they think truth constitutes.

人们带着他们认为真理构成的先承诺来探讨这问题。

There's no sort of a priori reason why that should be a thing.

没有先的理由说明为什么会发生这种情况。

There is, however, not much to be said about the state of confidence a priori.

然而， 关于先置信度的状态没有太多可说的。

Truths a priori held their own against truths surely relative.

先的真理与肯定相对的真理相对。

So Bayesian statistics is where you have a set of beliefs about the world, you take new information in, and that new information allows you to update your priors, right, into a posterior distribution, into a new set of beliefs.

因此，贝叶斯统计学是这样的：你拥有一套关于世界的信念，当你获取新信息时， 这些新信息使你能够更新你的先信念，对吧？ 这样，你的先就转化为后分布，形成一组新的信念。 这非常棒。

It's a very difficult and confusing thing to translate into English, but the basic concept of shunyata in Sanskrit allows for this inscrutable prior condition of it's not just one thing because the full diversity of appearances is present, right?

这用英语翻译非常困难且令人困惑，但梵文中的“空性” 基本概念允许这种难以捉摸的先状态：它不仅仅是一种事物， 因为完整的多样性表象都存，对吧？

There are broadly three possible answers: (1) that it is itself known a priori; (2) that it is a postulate; (3) that it is an empirical generalisation from past instances in which it has been found to hold.

大致有三种可能的答案：（1）它本身是先已知的； (2) 它是一公设； (3) 它是对过去实例的经概括，它被发现其中成。

But if we want to think that there's a ground for ethics and that we can be out of our own welfare situation, then we have to go to this a priori metaphysical ground.

但如果我们认为伦理学有一基础， 并且我们可以超越自身的福利状况，那么我们就必须诉诸这种先的形而上学基础。

In any case, no such transcendental reasons prompted him to show the least respect for other princes, and especially other German ones, even though they too felt that they ruled by divine right.

无论如何，这些先的原因并没有促使他对其他君主表现出丝毫尊重， 尤其是其他德国君主， 尽管他们也认为自己的统治是神授的。

We judge, for example, that happiness is more desirable than misery, knowledge than ignorance, goodwill than hatred, and so on. Such judgements must, in part at least, be immediate and a priori.

例如，我们判断幸福比痛苦更可取，知识比无知更可取，善意比仇恨更可取，等等。这样的判断必须，至少部分地，是直接的和先的。

The a priori insistence on this unity ended by fatiguing the more active — or reactive — minds; and Lord Bacon tried to stop it.

对这种统一性的先坚持最终导致更活跃——或反应性——的头脑疲惫不堪； 培根勋爵试图阻止它。