So on page 73, so this is what I'm thinking of with being more sympathetic to vitalistic monism.

所以在第73页，这就是我所说的对活力一元论更同情的想法。

Hopefully, as a representative of a DUALISTIC VIEW of linguistic inquiry, sociolinguistics came into being in the 1960s and has formed an opposition to the dominant theory of Chomskyan linguistics ever since then.

语言与社会之间的密切关系早已得到认和研究。尽管这种说法的能是分散的，但以方便地从希腊 - 罗马传统或印度历史上伟大哲家和语法家的作品中汲取。在整个 20 世纪，人们付出大量努力，将语言的研究视为对一门独立科的一元论或自主追求。受这种语言主流观点的强烈影响，语言的结构研究与其使用的社会语境被分离、声称、明和加强。很明显，这种对语言研究的僵化理解已经关领域任何更健康交流的大门。希望作为语言研究二元论观点的代表，社会语言于 20 世纪 60 年代应运而生，并从此与乔姆斯基语言的主导理论形成对立。

So he gives us this point-by-point analysis of a variety of monistic theories, including Buddhism and then vitalists like Bergson, even our friend Driesch.

所以他给我们进行各种一元论理论的逐点分析，包括佛教， 还有像柏格森这样的活力主义者，甚至是我们的好朋友德里施。

Still, Spinoza's monism was a pantheism in which God was everything and everything was part of everything else.

尽管如此，斯宾诺莎的一元论仍然是一种泛神论，在这种论中，上帝就是一切，一切都是其他一切的一部分。

We have to preserve the separateness of ourselves, but there's an underlying vitalistic unity in us, so just to kind of foreshadow where we're going with this and why he's still interested in in monism in some form.

我们必须保持自身的独立性，但我们的内在有一种生命力的统一性，所以先稍微预示一下我们要讨论的方向， 以及为什么他仍然对某种形式的一元论感兴趣。

So it's neither the case that metaphysical monism in the sense of the unity of selves explains fellow-feeling, nor is it the case that when we are having fellow-feeling, that we are getting insight, knowledge of that metaphysical truth.

所以形而上一元论意义上的自我统一并不能解释同情，也不是说当我们产生同情时，我们就能洞察到那个形而上的真理。

So then he's going to give us a little analysis of what metaphysical monism involves.

那么，他将为我们简要分析一下形而上一元论所涉及的内容。

And they'll say it's an unquestionable advance on the earlier monistic standpoints of Hegel, etc. Just on that same page, lower down, the metaphysical universe of life is taken for granted by leaders of thought so widely divergent.

他们会说，相较于黑格尔等早期的一元论观点， 这是一个毫无疑问的进步。就在同一页的下方，那些思想领袖们， 尽管观点大相径庭， 却都理所当然地接受生命本体论的宇宙观。