The first serious attempt to establish idealism on such grounds was that of Bishop Berkeley.

在这种基础上建立唯心主义的第一个认尝试是 Bishop Berkeley。

The definition of truth as the correspondence between beliefs and facts seems peculiarly evident in the case of memory, as against not only the pragmatist definition but also the idealist definition by means of coherence.

定义为信念与事实之间的对应关系， 在记忆的情况下似乎特别明显， 这不仅与实用主义的定义相反， 而且与通过连贯性的唯心主义定义相反。

Whereas then when we perform the reduction, we are placing the whole realism versus idealism debate In abeyance, we're just gonna consider the pure appearances without regard to their ultimate metaphysical status.

然而， 当我们进行还原时，我们暂且搁置了整个实在论与唯心论的争论，仅关注纯粹的现象， 而不考虑其最终的形而上学地位。

The logic of the idealist tradition has gradually grown very complex and very abstruse, as may be seen from the Bradleian sample considered in our first lecture.

唯心主义传统的逻辑逐渐变得非常复杂和深奥，从我们第一讲中考虑的 Bradleian 样本中可以看出这一点。

Kind of, you know, Samuel Johnson's famous retort to philosophical idealism, like he just kicked a stone and then said, you know, I refute him thusly.

有点像塞缪尔·约翰逊对哲学唯心主义的著名反驳，他只是踢了一块石头， 然后说，我是这样反驳他的。

Thus, when we reject the act, which I think we must, we are driven to a theory of memory which is more akin to idealism.

因此，当我们拒绝这种行为时， 我认为我们必须这样做， 我们驱使到一种更类似于唯心主义的记忆论。

What Fichte tried to do, therefore, was to use Kant's method—stripped of the concept of the unknowable thing-in-itself—and transform Kant's critical idealism into a metaphysical idealism.

因此，费希特试图做的是使用康德的方法——剥离了不可知的事物本身的概念——并康德的批判唯心主义转变为形而上学的唯心主义。

Hence his grounds in favour of idealism may be dismissed.

因此，他支持唯心主义的由可能驳回。

Such a world does not require an idealistic Platonic response, but a historical response, of the kind found in Thucydides.

这样的界不需要柏拉图式的唯心主义回应，而是修昔底德式的历史回应。

The same view of " consciousness" is set forth in the succeeding essay, " A World of Pure Experience" (ib., pp. 39-91). The use of the phrase " pure experience" in both essays points to a lingering influence of idealism.

在随后的文章“纯粹体验的界”（同上，第 39-91 页）中提出了相同的“意识”观点。两篇文章中“纯粹经验”一词的使用都表明了挥之不去的唯心主义影响。

So he did not make the phenomenological move of let's set aside the realism versus idealism distinction.

因此，他并未采取现象学的方法，即暂时搁置实在论与唯心论的区分。

Other German philosophers also joined in the enterprise of transforming Kant's critical philosophy into a metaphysical idealism—most notably, Hegel, Schelling, and Schopenhauer.

其他德国哲学家也加入了康德的批判哲学转变为形而上学唯心主义的事业——最著名的是黑格尔、谢林和叔本华。

I think it's just another kind of monism, but.

我认为这只是另一种形式的唯心论，但是。

The grounds on which idealism is advocated are generally grounds derived from the theory of knowledge, that is to say, from a discussion of the conditions which things must satisfy in order that we may be able to know them.

提倡唯心主义的基础通常是来自知识论的基础，也是说，来自对事物必须满足的条件的讨论，以便我们能够了解它们。

This illustrates a point which I am anxious to make clear from the outset. Any attempt to classify modern views, such as I propose to advocate, from the old standpoint of materialism and idealism, is only misleading.

这说明了我急于从一开始阐明的一点。任何试图从旧的唯物主义和唯心主义的立场来对现代观点进行分类的尝试，例如我提议提倡的，都只产生误导。

14-2HEGEL 14-2-2Absolute Mind As noted, the thrust of German idealism is that mind is ultimately the source and content of knowledge—not physical objects or some mysterious thingin-itself.

14-2黑格尔 14-2-2绝对心智如前所述，德国唯心主义的主旨是心智最终是知识的源头和内容，而不是物对象或某种神秘的事物本身。

We can begin to state the difference between realism and idealism in terms of this opposition of contents and objects.

我们可以从内容和对象的这种对立开始说明现实主义和唯心主义的区别。

In the early decades of the twentieth century, several Hegelian philosophers still engaged in the idealist task of system building.

在 20 纪初的几十年里，几位黑格尔哲学家仍然从事系统构建的唯心主义任务。

The German approach to idealism had Kantian philosophy as its starting point.

德国的唯心主义方法以康德哲学为出发点。

Berkeley defended the idealist position that there is no three-dimensional material world, and all that exists are spirit-minds and their thoughts.

贝克莱捍卫了唯心主义的立场，即没有三维的物质界，存在的只是精神-思想和他们的思想。